This is part of the China Chronicles series – 203rd essay
With the world in turmoil from Ukraine to the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, the European Union (EU) is already confronted with multiple international crises that demand its attention. Yet Brussels should prepare for another conflict zone: Taiwan, a flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific that has been flaring up regularly and with renewed intensity over the past few years.
Global attention is currently centred on political developments in the United States and on the conflict in the Middle East and its consequences for energy security. Meanwhile, Beijing continues, quietly yet firmly, to build military pressure around the self-governed island. This matters because any military or coercive action around Taiwan would have enormous consequences for the world and for EU economies. These consequences stem not only from the island’s proximity to the world’s busiest shipping lanes but, more importantly, from its role as the prime hub for semiconductor manufacturing, a sector indispensable to powering modern
Brussels’ Strategic Pivot to Asia
For the EU, the prospect of a Taiwan contingency raises questions not only about its economic exposure but also about its capacity to mount a coordinated and independent response. This has prompted a flurry of debates, tabletop simulations and strategic documents examining potential conflict scenarios around Taiwan — from a blockade to a full-scale invasion. The European Union (EU) is also beginning to prepare for such contingencies. Last year, the European Parliament addressed the issue in its annual Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) report, recommending contingency planning and enhanced preparedness.
For the EU, the prospect of a Taiwan contingency raises questions not only about its economic exposure but also about its capacity to mount a coordinated and independent response.
Because the CSDP requires unanimity for foreign-policy decisions, it may be difficult for the EU to take drastic action in the event of a Taiwan contingency. For instance, securing consensus on wide-ranging sanctions on China in the event of a conflict around Taiwan could prove harder than it did with Russia. The economic dependencies on China are of a different magnitude: EU-China trade in goods totalled €732 billion in 2024, nearly 2.8 times the €257.5 billion recorded in EU-Russia trade in 2021, before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Nonetheless, the EU can still prepare for a contingency without resorting to military or coercive action, relying instead on economic leverage and backup measures. These include targeted sanctions on individual companies to deny them access to the EU market, which are required to sustain a long trade and diplomatic conflict, and financial support for Taipei that stops short of military assistance.
However, preparing for such contingencies will prove challenging. The EU’s attention to the Indo-Pacific is now under strain, with the bloc bearing the full cost of supporting Ukraine after the American pivot to “hemispheric defence”. Moreover, the EU will have to plan its response to such contingencies — and not necessarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — because the United States might well turn a blind eye if Taiwan were to be blockaded or invaded. European nations should therefore prepare a genuinely autonomous and coordinated response to China’s increasingly assertive stance on Taiwan, one that neither toes Washington’s line nor waits for its approval.
Inverting the question, one should ask as much what Washington can expect from Brussels in a Taiwan contingency as what Brussels can expect from Washington in defending international law and Taiwan’s sovereignty. Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia now seems a distant memory — as Donald Trump seeks closer ties with Xi Jinping to craft a G2 world order, while Washington remains preoccupied with the Middle East after more than a quarter-century of war in the region.
The Wider Indo-Pacific Equation
The bigger question is what any country would do in a Taiwan contingency, given that China is the world’s second-largest economy and the largest trading partner for most economies. Some Europeans might also turn their attention to India. Despite a long standoff with China in the Himalayas, its dealings with Beijing have remained firm yet deftly restrained and measured.
To counter Beijing, both Brussels and New Delhi have a strong vested interest in partnering more closely to develop supply-chain resilience, trade linkages, and security and defence co-production.
To counter Beijing, both Brussels and New Delhi have a strong vested interest in partnering more closely to develop supply-chain resilience, trade linkages, and security and defence co-production. This realisation prompted New Delhi and Brussels to hasten the conclusion of the twin bilateral deals they signed earlier this year: the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (EUFTA) and the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP).
From Interdependence to De-risking
The war in Ukraine caught the EU’s decision-making bodies and many member states by surprise. Yet through its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU reacted swiftly and decisively to Russian aggression, supporting Kyiv and conveying to Beijing that China has been an “enabler” of Russia’s war effort. Having demonstrated its diplomatic and security capabilities in responding to the war, Brussels is now better positioned to handle similar scenarios, with a comprehensive legal, diplomatic and security toolkit at its disposal.
The EU’s relationship with China has moved from economic interdependence towards “de-risking” and “co-existence”.
Additionally, EU decision-making on trade and investment with China, once dispersed, now looks more unified across the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. While the “China shock 2.0” is real, Brussels is clear-eyed about what China’s dominance over economic levers, such as supply chains and critical minerals, including batteries, implies for the economic security of the EU. This explains why the EU’s relationship with China has moved from economic interdependence towards “de-risking” and “co-existence”. Both aim to preserve the EU’s ability to act independently and prevent Beijing from undermining its competitiveness, particularly in the automotive and artificial intelligence sectors. Against this backdrop, Brussels is crafting new trade and security deals with major powers, such as India, to maximise its strategic autonomy and leverage in the great power competition now playing out.
However consistent Brussels’ China policy may be, individual member states can still undermine a common EU approach, as they have done in the past. This has been evident in the 16+1 format and in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, which has acted as a Trojan horse for Chinese investments in the EU. Yet these divergences are beginning to subside in response to the “China shock”, with European capitals increasingly coordinating their positions to present China with a united front.
This coordination does not preclude individual countries or ad hoc groupings from sending their own strategic signals. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, for instance, have demonstrated their presence in the Taiwan Strait through naval transits and have participated in exercises with major Indo-Pacific partners to help secure sea lines of communication, signalling their commitment to international law and freedom of navigation.
The challenge will be to translate this growing awareness into coordinated action, while preserving Europe’s strategic autonomy and strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries such as India.
Both Brussels and European capitals are therefore preparing for long-term economic competition with Beijing without losing sight of the security and defence issues at play in East Asia and around the Taiwan Strait, as the two dynamics are interwoven. The challenge will be to translate this growing awareness into coordinated action, while preserving Europe’s strategic autonomy and strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries such as India.
Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Source: www.orfonline.org



