The UAE’s investments in ports, logistics, energy, and infrastructure aim not only to generate returns but also to embed the UAE at the center of trade routes connecting Africa to Asia and Europe as part of its economic corridor strategy. For instance, Emirati port investments across the continent link African shipping to Dubai’s Jebel Ali hub. On September 9, 2026, Dubai logistics company DP World and Kenyan conglomerate GulfCap Group signed a deal to develop a major special economic zone in Mombasa valued at more than $100 million. These investments also create stakes in African countries’ trade hubs to direct and increase trade.
Similarly, the UAE prioritizes agriculture as a strategic investment to bolster food security, as it relies on imports for 85–90 percent of its food. Abu Dhabi signed 17 agreements with Ethiopia in 2023 covering agriculture, industry, investment, and finance. This was followed by a currency-swap agreement in 2024, which eases trade and investment flows, supports the UAE’s broader push to de-dollarize bilateral trade, and extends the relationship into monetary policy.
Meanwhile, Kenya became the third African state (after Mauritius and Morocco) to sign a CEPA with the UAE in January 2025. Not long after, Nigeria signed its own CEPA with the UAE in 2026. Both agreements are intended to expand market access, reduce tariff barriers, and support increased investment flows from the UAE—though they were not yet in force as of October 2026.
Saudi Arabia’s engagement is narrower but has accelerated rapidly—marked by increased trade and engagement with the continent—in line with its diversification strategies under Vision 2030 and efforts to build economic resilience. Its priorities center on food security, securing maritime trade through the Red Sea, investing in infrastructure, and accessing new and growing markets. Since 2024, Riyadh has created joint business councils with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria, signaling these countries’ growing economic importance to the kingdom. In Kenya, agreements signed in 2026 paved the way for direct cooperation between the Saudi Export−Import Bank and the Kenya Development Corporation and created mechanisms to steer Saudi capital toward Kenyan infrastructure, logistics, and industrial projects.
Qatar lags behind the UAE and Saudi Arabia in its economic engagement with African middle powers. It has adopted a more selective model, concentrating on sectors where it possesses comparative advantages, such as aviation and energy. For example, Qatar Airways expanded its partnership with Kenya Airways in 2025, while Qatari and Nigerian companies agreed in 2026 to pursue four joint energy projects, including a roughly $2 billion natural gas exploration venture.
Political Ties
The growing relationship over the past decade stems from sustained diplomatic engagement. Gulf state summits have increasingly connected these countries’ leaders and created opportunities for additional high-level cooperation. For example, the 2023 Saudi-Africa Summit brought Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Kenyan President William Ruto to Riyadh. Other Gulf-hosted gatherings, such as Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative conference, Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week, and Dubai’s Expo 2020, have also served as forums for leader-led engagement between the countries. In this way, Gulf political outreach to African middle powers can be seen as part of efforts to assert global leadership and diversify partnerships. Notably, Nigeria and the UAE signed their CEPA on the sidelines of the 2026 Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week.
Expanded leader-to-leader relationships have created new diplomatic opportunities. For instance, Saudi Arabia played a role in mediating between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which led to the 2018 Jeddah Peace Agreement that officially ended the 1998–2000 border war. Similarly, Qatari mediation helped restore diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia in 2021 after almost six months of severed ties. Although high-level engagement focuses mainly on economic cooperation, there is growing emphasis on defense and security as well.
Security Ties
Security and defense cooperation has increased since 2020, advancing through structured defense agreements, joint training exercises, and arms transfers from Gulf to African middle powers. As in the economic sphere, the UAE is leading Gulf countries’ engagement, largely through arms sales and military-to-military ties. However, over the past two to three years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly collaborated with African middle powers on various security initiatives. In December 2025, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense and military cooperation covering training, intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and counterterrorism cooperation. Similarly, Kenya has recently signed defense cooperation agreements with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia; joint training exercises have been an important component of these agreements. For Saudi Arabia’s part, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, an intergovernmental alliance headquartered in Riyadh, has hosted Nigerian military personnel for training and held multiple courses in Nairobi.
Increased arms deals and transfers between Gulf states and African middle powers have been reported, yet they remain among the least transparent aspects of these bilateral relationships. Verified arms shipments increased around 2020, driven largely by policy changes in the UAE. In 2019, Abu Dhabi formed Edge Group by merging over 20 domestic defense firms to reduce its reliance on Western arms and become a net defense and security exporter. The UAE has complemented this policy shift by leveraging its broad diplomatic partnerships to build out a multi-country logistics network. The consequences are largely documented through the use of UAE-made arms in conflicts such as those in Sudan and Ethiopia. For example, during the 2020–2022 Tigray war in Ethiopia, the UAE was reported to have delivered precision-guided munitions and small arms to the Ethiopian National Defense Force.
The proliferation of military-capable drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, across Africa has exacerbated tensions between Gulf states and made it more difficult for African middle powers to balance their ties with them. The UAE’s alleged ongoingmilitarybacking of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and Saudi Arabia’s strategic partnership with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) put the two Gulf states on opposite sides of the conflict in Sudan. Their roles in this conflict have created a difficult balancing act for Kenya and Ethiopia in particular, as both countries have been accused of supporting the RSF even as they seek to maintain close economic ties with Saudi Arabia.
The Impact of the Iran War
The Gulf
The war with Iran has forced dramatic shifts in Gulf states’ economic strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted their exports and imports, raised shipping costs, and exposed their dependence on external markets and suppliers for food and other essential goods. More broadly, the conflict threatens to undermine Gulf states’ economic diversification strategies, a shared cornerstone of their ambitious visions centered on significant non-hydrocarbon economic growth and global connectivity.
Source: www.csis.org



