More than 15 million internal files. Emails from senior executives. Secret risk assessments. Suspicious transaction reports. Private information about billionaires, oligarchs, politicians and royalty. Records involving Donald Trump, Jeffrey Epstein and sanctioned businessmen. Previously undisclosed companies linked to authoritarian regimes.
Together, they add up to the largest cache of internal documents ever leaked to journalists from within a bank.
For months, more than 200 reporters from around the world examined the huge cache as part of an investigation called Inside Deutsche Bank. The records span some of the bank’s most sensitive functions and activities: anti-financial crime, sanctions monitoring, internal auditing and the units responsible for deciding whether risky clients stay or go.
When Christian Sewing became the chief executive of Deutsche Bank in 2018, after a string of scandals had tainted the bank’s reputation, he promised that the institution would be different: more stable and “a bit more boring.”
The bank has since spent years trying to convince the world that its era of scandals is over. The Inside Deutsche Bank project severely tests that narrative, laying bare a bank that built an enormous compliance machinery but repeatedly struggled to make it work.
The leak, provided via two whistleblowers, was shared with Indian journalist Josy Joseph and South African journalist Khadija Sharife. Barracuda Media, a non-profit vehicle, was established to analyse the data and share it with reporters from more than 50 global media outlets spanning over 50 countries.
The whistleblowers, whose identities are being protected, copied the files and removed them from the institution. Besides giving them to Joseph and Sharife, they also provided material to the US Department of Justice, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the UK’s HM Revenue and Customs, their lawyer confirmed.
It is evident that the whistleblowers wanted to expose Deutsche Bank’s relationships with both Russian oligarchs and Russian money.
“We are deeply committed to serving the public interest,” they said in a statement. They said the public has a right to know about the bank’s misconduct and its extensive banking of oligarchs. According to one of the whistleblowers, they believed the files contained potential criminal misconduct regarding business relationships with corrupt regimes.
The files show Deutsche Bank repeatedly missed warning signs of possible money laundering and sanctions violations. It bent its own rules for powerful clients. It allowed business considerations to override its own compliance regime. Sometimes, the bank only discovered serious failures years after suspicious money had passed through its systems.
The files also expose the intimate financial information of extremely powerful people.
Deutsche Bank accepted Epstein as a client in 2013, years after his conviction for soliciting prostitution from a minor. The leak shows the bank later identified nearly $600 million in suspicious transactions involving him and his network — more than twice the amount previously publicly known.
Besides Trump and Epstein, who both famously used Deutsche Bank after other institutions shied away, the leak holds extensive details on Vladimir Putin-allied oligarchs like Oleg Deripaska and Roman Abramovich.
Deutsche Bank’s clients included a company whose ultimate beneficial owner was a Saudi businessman named on the famous “Golden Chain” list of purported sponsors of Al-Qaeda. And as a third-party correspondent bank, Deutsche Bank helped process payments linked to the late Rifaat al-Assad, Syria’s former vice-president known as the Butcher of Hama for his role in a bloody 1982 crackdown in the Syrian city.
In 2015, despite mounting adverse media reports and its own suspicious activity reports, or SARs, surrounding Jho Low, Deutsche Bank continued to process millions in transfers linked to the Malaysian financier.
Low is a central figure in the 1MDB scandal in which more than $4.5 billion was allegedly stolen from Malaysia’s state investment fund and laundered through global banks. Deutsche Bank’s Malaysian entity Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad is now being sued by 1MDB over its alleged role in moving part of these funds.
On the al-Assad payments, Deutsche Bank said:
“This matter has been resolved in 2022, as publicly disclosed. In the investigation proceedings of the public prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt in connection with two suspicious activity reports (SAR) filed by Deutsche Bank in the correspondent banking business, the bank accepted a fine of €7.01 million. The administrative penalty notice contains the allegations that the SARs were submitted too late because they should have been made in 2017 already. The bank cooperated in the proceedings.”
Deutsche Bank did not respond to questions about the individual on the Golden Chain list. The individual, who is identified in bank files only by his initials, was identified by reporters but did not respond to a request for comment.
Deripaska did not respond to requests for comment. Trump did not respond to a request for comment. Low could not be reached for comment.
A law firm representing Abramovich told reporters it is “not for our client to comment on Deutsche Bank’s internal processes and decisions.”
“To the extent those internal processes documented unfounded speculation concerning our client, he rejects that speculation,” they added. “He denies any allegation or suggestion of wrongdoing, including any allegation of criminal conduct, corruption or impropriety.”
The bank said: “We do not comment on potential, former or existing client relationships.”
On Epstein, the bank said it “acknowledges its error of onboarding Epstein in 2013 and regrets our historical connection with him. We have cooperated with regulatory and law enforcement agencies and the US Congress regarding their investigations and have been transparent in addressing these matters in parallel.”
In a response to the wide range of topics raised in the leak, Deutsche Bank said matters raised by reporters “date back many years, in some cases decades. Where relevant, the bank said, these matters were reviewed at the time and were discussed with regulators and competent authorities as necessary.
“We are a different bank today,” the bank added. “Under Christian Sewing’s leadership, Deutsche Bank has gone through a fundamental transformation.”
The bank said it had invested 7 billion euros in its control environment between 2019 and 2025, supported by significant technology investments.
“These investments have been accompanied by a reinforced approach to identify and manage risks and a fundamental shift in culture. This work has supported the remediation of legacy issues and the completion of significant regulatory milestones.”
“Our progress has been recognised by the market, key regulators and supervisory authorities, as well as clients and other stakeholders. We remain committed to ensuring continuous enhancements of our control environment and a culture of integrity.”
Secrets
Over the coming weeks, the Inside Deutsche Bank media partners will publish many more stories drawn from the files. The files hold the secrets a major global bank is meant to keep confidential, unless it wants to lose its clients’ trust. Now, those secrets are out.
Deutsche Bank has paid more than 20 billion euros in fines and settlements since the year 2000 over identified failures related to mortgage securities, interest-rate manipulation, Russian mirror trades, anti-money-laundering failures, and other misconduct. Its reputation at one point became so toxic that, according to one internal account, BMW billionaire heiress Susanne Klatten declined an invitation from the bank, citing its poor reputation. Klatten denied refusing any such invitation from the bank, or that she ever used such terms in relation to the bank.
Now, the Inside Deutsche Bank investigation raises the question of whether one of the world’s largest financial institutions — deemed “too big to fail” after the 2008 financial crisis — is too broken to be able to fix itself. The bank operates across roughly 55 countries directly, and more than 140 countries are reached by its correspondent banking network.

Though the bank told reporters it is a “different bank today,” the leaked files show it has not become “boring” by any stretch of the imagination since Sewing took the helm.
In one case never before made public, the leak shows that in 2019 employees found what they believed to be a sprawling money laundering network that had moved hundreds of millions of euros, using the bank’s systems, through companies in Cyprus, Britain, Hong Kong and Ukraine.
The bank’s monitoring systems had detected pieces of the puzzle, but missed the big picture. It took roughly three years before one employee spotted the pattern, leading a manager to joke that the bank had found another “employee of the month.” The manager soon made a more important observation: “Our systems explicitly failed to detect it.”
In a response, the bank said it “takes its anti-financial crime and sanction-related obligations extremely seriously.” It said it “reviews potentially unusual activity, reports matters to the relevant authorities where required, and cooperates with lawful requests for information.”
In Colombia the bank’s own internal investigation, dubbed Project Cali, showed that in 2019 it had processed thousands of transactions for companies linked to the adult entertainment business. The money had been sent to women in Colombia through suspicious paths without the bank reporting most of the transactions to authorities.
The internal investigation flagged at least eight companies for “money laundering,” and another as “organised crime.” When the bank finally spotted the red flags it had missed across 2019, it filed 230 SARs and prohibited all payments from those companies. By that point, millions had already been transacted.
In a response on Project Cali, Deutsche Bank said it was “a historical review that led to specific remediation measures and a broader reassessment of financial-crime risks across Deutsche Bank’s correspondent- banking portfolio.”
“Decisions on suspicious-activity reporting are governed by jurisdiction-specific legal and confidentiality requirements, and we therefore cannot comment on individual reports, transactions, entities or counterparties.”
Reporters also found that beginning in 2015 Deutsche Bank facilitated transactions worth hundreds of millions of dollars involving the Singapore-based Xangbo group without spotting, or acting on, warning signs of suspicious activity.
These included transactions, made via Deutsche Bank’s Singapore branch, between Deutsche Bank’s Xangbo group clients and three companies accused of laundering alleged kickbacks for the Gupta brothers, who have been implicated in massive corruption and state capture in South Africa.
The Gupta-linked companies were allowed to move about $675 million between December 2012 and January 2017 through the Xangbo network, continuing even as South Africa erupted in public protests over the scandal that implicated the brothers. Of these movements, 30 pairs of transactions totalling $167 million were carried out across multiple accounts, often being done within a day.
It took an external whistleblower’s December 2019 allegations about unrelated, allegedly fraudulent activity in Singapore and elsewhere to finally nudge Deutsche Bank to further examine Xangbo’s transactions in more depth. Even then, records show the bank did not begin the process of exiting its relationship with Xangbo until 2021. Records further show the bank decided there were “no reasonable grounds” to file a report about a suite of convoluted transactions involving Xangbo.
In a response, Xangbo told reporters its accounts at the bank were not closed because of any dealings the group had with the Gupta-linked companies. “That is absolutely false,” a spokesperson said, adding that Deutsche Bank “continued to be our prime broker till 2022.”
The Guptas did not respond to a request for comment. They have previously said allegations against them are politically motivated.
In a response, Deutsche Bank said reporters’ findings on its dealings with Xangbo contained “several inaccuracies.” The bank said it would not comment on potential, former or existing client relationships, or on “actual or potential suspicious activity reporting.”
Meanwhile, reporters found that transactions involving suspected North Korean front companies went undetected even though some payment information contained the words “North Korea.”
“As a matter of policy, Deutsche Bank restricted dealing with North Korea and engaged with law enforcement and our regulators, as required,” the bank told reporters.
Room to manoeuvre
Sometimes, reporters found, the problem wasn’t incompetence — it was the bank’s appetite for business.
In one leaked email Sewing, who was then a member of the management board, complained that know-your-customer or KYC rules — the basic requirement that banks understand who their clients are, and where their money comes from — were affecting the bottom line. KYC bricht uns das revenue Genick, he wrote. KYC is breaking the back of our revenue.
In a response, the bank said it strongly rejects what it called “false insinuations” about Sewing’s “alleged attitude.”
It added: “Christian Sewing always emphasised that controls and risk management must be taken seriously and set as boundaries for the business. His focus on strong controls and risk management builds on a career during which he worked across all three lines of defence, spending the majority of the time in control functions.”
A recurring tension runs through the leak: People charged with controlling risk were repeatedly met with people paid to generate revenue. Amid this clash, powerful customers often had room to manoeuvre.
Take Timur Kulibayev, the billionaire son-in-law of Kazakhstan’s former president. Files show the bank acknowledging “historical concern as to the legitimacy of (Kulibayev’s) original source of wealth.”
In internal documents which identify Kulibayev as a bank “client” since as far back as 2006, it is also pointed out that in 2013, a risk analysis commissioned by the bank on Kulibayev had “highlighted a number of corruption allegations” stretching back to the early 2000s.
The bank’s anti-financial-crime department noted that he had not been convicted of corruption, and that one of his companies had provided evidence to show that criminal investigations into him in Europe had been dropped.
Yet after Kulibayev provided insufficient explanation for a January, 2020 “inflow” of $15 million into his account from a United Arab Emirates account, files show Deutsche Bank blocked the incoming funds.
Records indicate that weeks later, employees began the process of opening a Deutsche Bank account in Luxembourg under his wife’s name. Only months after that point did the bank discuss the possibility of ending the long relationship.
Kulibayev, via his law firm, denied any wrongdoing. The law firm said the bank had been made aware of his sources of income, which derived primarily from a joint ownership, with his wife, of the investment firm Almex and its shareholding in Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan.
A statement added: “Any suggestion therefore that Mr Kulibayev (or individuals working for him) concealed his source of wealth from Deutsche Bank, or knowingly provided false or misleading information about it, is categorically false.”
The law firm said Kulibayev was unable to identify the $15 million transaction based on the information provided. It added that any suggestion Kulibayev had personally banked with Deutsche Bank in the mid-2000s was false, and he “did not open a personal account until many years later.” It said reporters were appearing to “conflate the distinct personal and corporate banking relationships maintained by Mr Kulibayev and his businesses.”
Deutsche Bank said it does “not comment on actual, potential or former client relationships.”
Elsewhere, the bank can be seen choosing not to conduct a formal sanctions-risk review for subsidiaries of Bombardier, the Canadian aerospace and defence company, despite internal references to Bombardier’s doing business in prohibited, “special risk” countries. The justification given for the decision to instead perform an “informal” review included Deutsche Bank’s long relationship with the company. Bombardier revenues from these high-risk countries, it was pointed out, were low.
Bombardier did not respond to a request for comment.
The leak also exposes the flexibility of the bank’s hiring processes.
It recruited the children of influential politicians, executives and government officials, including applicants who failed aptitude tests or lacked qualifications. Alexey Storchak, the son of Russia’s deputy finance minister, was hired in 2010 and subsequently supplied colleagues with non-public information surrounding a bond issuance. As a result, files show Deutsche Bank itself subsequently investigated whether the bank itself should have ever possessed such information.
In 2019, the bank paid $16.1 million in a settlement after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigated its hiring program. An internal calculation contained in the leak found that the bank generated roughly $190 million in revenues from transactions linked to the hiring of relatives of foreign government officials.
Storchak did not respond to a request for comment.
‘Good and bad oligarchs’
Russia, and the bank’s dealings with it, were among the whistleblowers’ primary concerns when contacting reporters with their information.
After Putin annexed Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions forced banks to decide which Russian clients were still palatable. “We started making lists,” a former Deutsche Bank insider told reporters. “Good and bad oligarchs.”
The leaked documents show the bank repeatedly facilitating sanctioned or politically exposed Russians, and remaining reluctant to fully abandon its long Russian entanglement. Documents show that by May 2020, with expansion of certain Russian business being planned by bank leaders, the move was described by one anti-financial-crime specialist as akin to throwing her team in front of a train.
Russia has continued to haunt the bank; early this year, German investigators searched Deutsche Bank’s Frankfurt headquarters in an investigation involving transactions reportedly associated with the oligarch Abramovich.
In a response, lawyers representing Abramovich said they had been instructed, “that the German authorities confirmed to our client that he is not under investigation in connection with the search of Deutsche Bank’s premises by the German Federal Criminal Police Office in January 2026.”
“Neither the German authorities nor Deutsche Bank has referred to our client (whether directly or indirectly) in any public statement about the searches, or indicated that any allegation is being made against him.”

Through correspondent banking, the invisible plumbing of global finance, Deutsche Bank moves money for other banks, giving them access to euros, dollars and international markets. It is lucrative and exceptionally difficult to police, and the underlying customers may be several steps removed from Deutsche Bank itself. Criminals, sanctioned entities and shell companies can disappear inside millions of ostensibly legitimate transactions.
Can a bank reliably identify money laundering, drug trafficking and human smuggling within such a system?
“No,” said Ulrich Göres, former head of Deutsche Bank’s anti-financial crime department. Why do banks do it? “For banking for high risk countries, and for high risk industries generally, higher fees can be charged.”
In one of its biggest scandals to date, Deutsche Bank was a major correspondent bank for Danske Bank’s Estonian branch. Roughly 200 billion euros flowed through Danske Bank’s Estonian branch between 2007 and 2015, much of it involving customers from Russia and other former Soviet states. Deutsche Bank helped process international payments for the branch as a correspondent bank.
In 2020, German authorities fined the bank 13.5 million euros for failing to promptly report suspicious transactions.“ Such penalties are a weak deterrent, Göres said, unless the penalty payments exceed the income generated previously.
On correspondent banking, Deutsche Bank said:
“Over the past decade, Deutsche Bank has substantially reduced its risk profile in this business, including exiting high-risk clients and countries. At the same time the bank has materially strengthened its financial crime controls and expertise … to manage the inherently elevated financial-crime risk in correspondent banking through significant investments.”
Junta warnings
Like its hiring practices, the bank’s climate aspirations proved flexible.
In 2020, Deutsche Bank promised it would no longer finance new oil and gas projects in the Arctic. Months later, it processed a 1.5 billion-euro payment connected to commodities giant Trafigura’s investment in the Arctic Vostok Oil project. The internal reasoning: Deutsche Bank was merely processing the transaction on behalf of Trafigura, they were not financing it themselves.
In a response Trafigura, which withdrew from the Vostok Oil project in 2022, confirmed the $1.5 billion transaction, made via Deutsche Bank, had taken place. Deutsche Bank did not directly address questions regarding Trafigura.
After Sewing publicly committed Deutsche Bank to a net-zero future in 2021, bankers pursued major Russian gas and petrochemical projects. When industrial chemicals multinational Linde sought the bank’s support for a huge gas complex in Ust-Luga, Russia, internal experts raised financial-crime, reputational and environmental concerns.

The head of trade finance had a different priority. “Super important and we must win this.” The deal was approved.
In a response, Linde said it holds itself accountable for the environmental performance of its operations “through clear targets and transparent reporting.”
A statement added: “In response to the invasion (of Ukraine) and the impact of global sanctions, Linde deconsolidated its Russian industrial gases and engineering business entities as of June 30, 2022; the company has operated in strict compliance with all applicable global sanctions and ceased any involvement in the Ust-Luga project.”
Deutsche Bank said the suggestion that it “sought to circumvent or avoid applying its sustainability framework is incorrect. The bank applies its policies and governance processes to transactions and client activities in accordance with the standards applicable at the relevant time.”
It added: “At the time the Ust-Luga LNG project was initiated, the relevant counterparties were not prohibited under applicable sanctions.” It said the transaction “was subject to the bank’s established environmental and reputational risk review processes.”
In Myanmar, the bank’s dealings have also raised concerns.
External advocates including a group of US senators warned in 2021 that business dealings between multinational energy companies and Myanmar’s state energy company MOGE could indirectly support the military junta.
Yet Deutsche Bank emails indicate it approved an increase in a guarantee to energy giant Halliburton for work in Myanmar shortly before the European Union sanctioned MOGE in February 2022. Records show the guarantee was to cover Halliburton’s services that were provided to an oil field project that was partly owned by MOGE.
Halliburton did not respond to a request for comment. Deutsche Bank did not directly address questions related to Halliburton, Myanmar and MOGE.
‘New Order’
When Trump won his first presidential term on Nov 8, 2016, Deutsche Bank faced an almost unprecedented situation: the president-elect was also one of its most controversial borrowers. The bank created a special project around him, codenamed “Novus Ordo.” New Order.
Trump-related documents were secured. Access was restricted. Communications were encrypted. Personal contacts minimised. But there was a larger problem: Trump and his businesses still wanted things from Deutsche Bank, like changes to existing loans.
The relationship had already gone spectacularly wrong once. After Trump failed to repay a loan for his Chicago tower during the financial crisis, he sued Deutsche Bank for $3 billion, essentially blaming it for a crisis that had damaged his business (the case was settled before trial). Deutsche Bank continued doing business with him.
And then came Russia.
As American prosecutors examined alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, leading Democrats in the US Congress wanted to know whether Russians had guaranteed Trump’s Deutsche Bank loans, and whether Trump-related entities had ever raised wider money-laundering concerns.
The bank conducted an extensive internal review. It was not aware, according to an internal email prepared by its New York branch in 2019, “of any Bank-related links between President Trump and Russia related to Mr. Trump’s business with Deutsche Bank.”
But a 2020 memo from Brian Hagerty, then the bank’s director of its US financial crimes intelligence unit, references transactions connected to two Trump companies named DT Marks Baku LLC and THC Baku Services LLC. Both companies are listed as owned by Trump in his 2015 financial disclosure report filed with the US Office of Government Ethics.
Hagerty could not be reached for comment.
The memo stated that neither company were Deutsche Bank customers. But transactions involving the companies had raised internal concerns over potential links to the Azerbaijani and Russian laundromats, two notorious money laundering schemes.
The Hagerty memo notes that in 2018, a transaction between THC Baku Services LLC and “an entity reportedly associated to the Russian Laundromat scheme” was “included in a SAR.”
Deutsche Bank would not comment on Trump. It said in general terms, “banks are legally prohibited from commenting on their discussions with supervisory authorities in the US and on Suspicious Activity Reports, including their existence or non-existence.”
Reporters also found that by 2017, with Trump well into his first term, a Deutsche Bank employee accidentally sent an outside party a link containing financial information for 1,586 customers. Three accounts allegedly belonged to the newly-inaugurated president; these were called “DT” and “DJT” internally.
Managers debated whether Trump had to be informed of the leak, but concluded he did not. One manager called it a “brilliant outcome.” Sewing approved the case’s handling with a simple, “Ok.”
Heightened scrutiny
The Inside Deutsche Bank leak comes at a particularly sensitive time for an institution already under heightened scrutiny. This year alone, its offices have been raided at least four times, and the bank has filed several self-disclosures with authorities, according to a source with insight into the investigation.
Amid this mounting pressure, the leak offers an unprecedented glimpse into what has been going on behind closed doors. Trump. Epstein. Deripaska. Abramovich. Jho Lo. Even Thailand’s King Rama X, who did not respond to a request for comment, was a client. The list of major names, and global corporations, in the leak is enormous.
For many of these clients, the story is not about any of their own misconduct. It is that Deutsche Bank possessed highly sensitive information about their finances, families, companies and internal risk classifications, and that this information escaped.

The bank itself had anticipated the danger.
After a much smaller incident involving misdirected customer information in 2021, an employee warned that specialised law firms might see a potential business model in suing the bank over data breaches. Soon, the employee predicted, customers would be able to find standard legal claims online and copy them “1:1”.
The Inside Deutsche Bank leak is of an entirely different magnitude.
Potential lawsuits are only one threat. Regulators may examine the bank’s data security and compliance systems. With material now in the hands of US authorities, they can search huge troves of files for conduct they did not previously know about. Customers can decide whether they still trust the bank with their secrets.
The most damaging takeaway from the Inside Deutsche Bank investigation may not be that the bank had no rules. In reality, it employed armies of compliance officers, built extensive monitoring systems, and repeatedly promised regulators that it had, in fact, learned from past failures.
But those rules collided with big business.
Again and again, the files show the same sequence: a warning appears, compliance teams raise concerns, executives debate risk, and the bank finds a reason to continue. Sometimes the client was an oligarch. Sometimes the business involved a sanctioned market or a lucrative energy project. Sometimes, the bank’s systems simply failed to notice what was happening at all.
For years, Deutsche Bank decided what regulators, customers and the public could see. That era is over.
Additional credits: Sophia Baumann (PTM), Maria Christoph (PTM), Eva Jung (Berlingske), Michael Lund (Berlingske), Maria Fernanda Cruz (Barracuda Media), Aidila Razak (Barracuda Media), Nikita Saxena, Craig Bentley-McKune (Financial Mail), Vernon Wessels (Financial Mail), Cynthia O’Murchu (FT), iStories, Hakan Tanriverdi (PTM), Lukas Kotkamp (Follow the Money), Naish Gawen (Data Desk), Maria Teresa Ronderos (CLIP), Francisca Skoknic (CLIP), Karina Shedrofsky (DARC), Vivian Yap (Malaysiakini), Nigel Aw (Malaysiakini), Aung Naing (Myanmar Now), Amy Doffegnies (Myanmar Now,) Hala Nasreddine (DARAJ).
Header art by Studio Yadi

The Inside Deutsche Bank investigation was coordinated by Barracuda Media in South Africa, with technical support from the Data and Research Center (DARC) in Germany.
Source: www.dawn.com



