I was recently at an event where a conversation sparked around the similarities and differences between India and China. What is it about Chinese culture and civilisation, the question went, that led the country to pursue wealth and power (fùqiáng) so assiduously and with such single-minded focus? Are there deeply ingrained ideas or cultural traits that made this the default approach of Chinese polity and society? The discussion drew on Orville Schell and John Delury’s Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century. The book profiles thinkers, reformers and leaders who, from the 19th century onwards, made the pursuit of wealth and power the centrepiece of their political vision for China. The underlying question was whether there is something in Indian culture that explains why India has not made the pursuit of wealth and power the organising principle of its politics and diplomacy.
I want to try and do some thinking aloud around this question via this post.
Of course, certain civilisational and cultural traits and elements play a role in how people and societies are structured and how world views are shaped. The inherited privilege of caste, for instance, can be compared to China’s scholar-official nobility and elite; the latter system in theory provided far more avenues for upward mobility based on merit. This difference, one would imagine, is significant in shaping how those who emerged as elite thought about the pursuit of wealth and power. But if we are looking for just civilisational or cultural explanations, particularly in the context of modern India and PRC’s approach to inter-state relations and global engagement, I think that’s a very limiting lens.
Another framework that tends to often come up is the argument that Indian culture is milder, softer, more focussed on metaphysical or idealistic pursuits and less inclined towards hard power. To me, this is a colonial and Orientalist trope—a stereotype that simply does not survive the test of evidence, and Indian history offers ample evidence of rulers who pursued power and prestige ruthlessly. The expansion of the Mauryan empire was not a product of soft power; it was conquest that was a product of deep understanding of the role of hard power. The evolution of the Mughal empire and Shivaji’s campaigns against the Mughals are also examples of Indian rulers being rather realists in their approach to inter-state relations. Of course, in large parts these events and Indian rulers’ conquests and defeats played out within the confines of the sub-continent. That said, there were others who ventured further out too. In the early 11 century, Rajendra Chola sent a naval expedition across the Bay of Bengal against the Srivijaya kingdom, nearly four centuries before the Ming treasure fleets set sail. Also, let’s not ignore that India produced one of the world’s great manuals of statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, which is as unsentimental about power as anything in the Chinese Legalist canon. In other words, if one choses to explore, there are sufficient pacifist, militarist, universalist and nativist traditions within Indian history and culture that one can pick from.
Conversely, there is ample evidence of Chinese dynasties turning away from the pursuit of power. Examples include the abrupt end of Zheng He’s voyages after 1433, the Ming maritime prohibitions, and an emphasis on ritual and the mastery of the classics over the technical skills of governance, policy delivery and modernisation. The Qianlong Emperor’s 1793 edict to George III, rebuffing the Macartney Embassy with the claim that China possessed “all things” and had no need of British manufactures, is perhaps the most famous expression of a self-sufficiency and insularity. Consider the Ming examination system too. Candidates were increasingly required to demonstrate mastery of the Four Books and Five Classics, which had become official orthodoxy under the Yuan in 1313. From the late 15th century, the eight-legged essay (八股文) became the prescribed format for examination answers. Candidates were expected to demonstrate mastery of classical and historical texts and commitment to orthodox interpretations, but were not necessarily tested on the specialised, technical aspects of state administration. The system was meritocratic, but merit meant classical learning, not necessarily administrative, martial or technical competence.
In fact, the calls for wealth, power and self-strengthening by the thinkers Schell and Delury profile show that, by the early 19th century, wealth and power were not the dominant pursuit of Chinese society or its rulers. Many of these figures were scathing about the Qing court’s incompetence and its distance from the modern world. Wei Yuan’s Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (1843), written after the First Opium War, urged China to “learn the superior techniques of the barbarians in order to control the barbarians.”
These laments show that fùqiáng was not a dominant cultural or civilisational inheritance. The idea of wealth and power does have classical roots, though The phrase fùguó qiángbīng (富国强兵) or “enrich the state, strengthen the army” is associated with Legalist thinkers such as Shang Yang and Han Feizi. But it had long been subordinated to a Confucian orthodoxy that viewed the open pursuit of profit and force with suspicion. What these thinkers’ writings reveal instead is a keen awareness of how the world was changing, and of how insulated the Qing court had become. It had shut itself off from the rise of modern European powers, their colonial expansion, and the churn of the Industrial Revolution, which was reshaping economic and social relations as well as the global balance of power. Tellingly, Meiji Japan adopted the very same slogan, fukoku kyōhei (富国強兵), as its national programme after 1868. That suggests the pursuit of wealth and power was a response to the Western challenge, not a uniquely Chinese cultural trait.
Where, then, does the difference between post-colonial India’s and China’s approaches to becoming a major power lie? There are obviously several factors that made the modern Chinese and Indian states the way they are and animated their leaders to pursue certain goals. For instance, there were differences in how Mao and Gandhi and Nehru conceptualised power, and this meant that they drew from very different native as well as Western traditions. There are also differences in terms of the structures of the states that they oversaw the establishment of. The PRC is a Leninist-Party state that has been pursuing a blend of nationalism and revolution. The modern Indian Republic is a unique socio-political experiment in democratic and federal state-building that is unparalleled in history. China was, and remains, considerably more ethnically homogeneous than India, although it has its own historically entrenched systems of social stratification based on class, status, occupation and regional hierarchies. India, by contrast, is characterised by extraordinary ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity, compounded by deeply entrenched and overlapping systems of social stratification based on caste, class, religion and community. Apart from all these, to my mind, the core difference lies in their different colonial experiences, and in how each emerged from colonialism to become an independent nation-state.
First, nature of political fragmentation and sovereignty. After the British Crown took over from the East India Company in 1858, much of subcontinent came under direct Crown rule, and then there were over 500 princely states under the Crown’s paramountcy. In essence, there was no native sovereign with a substantive claim over the entire region; sovereignty rested with the Crown. In China, by contrast, the Qing dynasty remained sovereign despite the concessions, treaty ports and leased territories held by a range of foreign powers. British and French troops sacked the Old Summer Palace in 1860, and the Eight-Nation Alliance occupied Beijing in 1900 to crush the Boxer Uprising. Even after both, the Qing remained the sovereign, albeit a terribly weak and ineffective one. This distinction is important, because whatever the chaos, China as a whole was never a colony. The Communist Party’s own description of pre-1949 China as “semi-colonial and semi-feudal” captures exactly this in-between status.
Second, because China was not a colony, the debates on liberation, democracy and the country’s future unfolded in a very different context from India’s. Both countries had a wide range of actors of every political hue. In China, the dominant players eventually became the Communists and the Nationalists. In India, the Gandhi-led Congress emerged dominant as a broad-tent movement, though there were significant political actors outside its fold. Moreover, China’s path to self-determination ran through a brutal civil war and the War of Resistance against Japan. Chinese self-determination therefore had a deeply martial character. That character became all the more significant because the Communists won, coming to power through conflict and violence. Mao’s dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” was not a metaphor; it was the Party’s experience. India too saw tremendous violence and turbulence, culminating in Partition, but the modern Indian Republic emerged with an ethos of Gandhian non-violence. To my mind, this ethos has shaped Indian policy ever since, and it still does to an extent. In doing so, it also embedded a sense of the moral superiority of the path India had taken to independence.
I am not endorsing this claim of moral superiority. Nor is such a self-image unique to India. Chinese foreign policy has long made its own moral claims, from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which Beijing and New Delhi agreed in 1954, to Yan Xuetong’s argument in Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power that lasting leadership rests on “humane authority” rather than hegemony. What I am arguing is that the idea of morality became embedded in the psyche of the Indian elite. In that sense, it became part of a shared political-cultural legacy. This was reinforced by the fact that independent India is a truly remarkable experiment. It is a multi-religious, multilingual, multi-ethnic and multicultural state; an electoral democracy with universal adult franchise from its first general election in 1951–52; and a modern republic built on constitutionalism, the rule of law and a Westminster-style Parliamentary system. Although it wasn’t devoid of realism, the moral self-image did play a major role in shaping India’s early diplomacy. China’s Communist leadership, by contrast, was forged in a far more hard-nosed experience of power won through the gun. It emerged from the turmoil that followed the fall of the Qing: the fragmentation of the early Republic, the warlord era, civil war and Japanese invasion. More fundamentally, Communism is rooted in materialism, not Gandhian metaphysics.
So, if you want to understand why the Indian and Chinese states and societies differ in this respect, the answer is not some deep cultural distinction. India perhaps has as many materialists as China does. Visit a private school in any big Indian city and listen to the conversations about holidays and gadgets, or look at the ostentation of weddings even in small towns. Even in matters of faith, Meera Nanda’s The God Market details the commercialisation of religion in India. A particularly striking observation in it concerns the role of certain deities as problem-solvers on the temporal plane, which to be is as materialist as one can get. Equally, there are plenty of non-materialists in China, from the religious, and those seeking a moral compass for a society unmoored by rapid growth and the grip of modernity. Ian Johnson captures this in The Souls of China. He notes that for millennia, Chinese philosophers held that “laws alone cannot keep people together”, and that society also needs shared values. Many Chinese today, he argues, seek those values through religion or moral cultivation, in search of more meaningful lives and a better society.
Therefore, to me, the answer to the original question about each state’s approach to wealth and power lies primarily in each society’s experience of colonialism, and in how it emerged from it. China’s modern elites were shaped by the failure of their own sovereign, and by a revolution that equated national survival with the accumulation of power. For them, wealth and power were not merely ambitions. They were the precondition for China’s existence as an independent entity. That is why the Communist Party still frames its project as national rejuvenation after a “century of humiliation”. India’s founding elites, by contrast, won independence through a mass movement across a fragmented polity and drew the movement’s legitimacy from moral persuasion and constitutional bargaining. They came to see India’s standing in the world as something earned by example, not merely by accumulated power. Neither inheritance, however, is fixed.
Source: trackingpeoplesdaily.substack.com



