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Europe’s Predicament: Immigration and the Social Contract
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Europe’s Predicament: Immigration and the Social Contract

French presidential elections in April 2027 could trigger a political earthquake as significant as that seen in the U.S. midterms, reflecting a broader resurgence of the far right across Europe. The continent is facing an unprecedented convergence of economic, social and political challenges—from sluggish growth and rising living costs to crises over immigration and integration,

French presidential elections in April 2027 could trigger a political earthquake as significant as that seen in the U.S. midterms, reflecting a broader resurgence of the far right across Europe. The continent is facing an unprecedented convergence of economic, social and political challenges—from sluggish growth and rising living costs to crises over immigration and integration, as faith in traditional institutions erodes.

These challenges extend to anxieties over identity, security and the future of the welfare state, reaching from the desks of decision-makers to permeate the daily lives of individuals and communities, and reshaping the electoral landscape. I recently visited several European capitals, where I engaged in deep discussions with experts and researchers. What struck me most was their mounting concern that these interconnected crises could coalesce into an electoral trend, driving ever-broader segments of the electorate toward the nationalist far right.

These conversations reflected a striking awareness that Europe may be entering a distinct phase of change not only in who governs, but in the very nature of the European project, the relationship between state and society, and the continent’s standing within the international order. The evidence points not only to the rise of right-wing and populist movements, but to the waning of the traditional political center and its capacity to govern or effect change.

Perhaps the most significant shift is that the nationalist right no longer needs to convince Western voters of its ideas; it suffices to persuade voters that its opponents are no longer fit to govern. Elections thus turn from contests between competing political platforms into referenda on the status quo.

What happens, then, when democratic institutions suffer a deficit of trust, while forces opposed to liberal values gain legitimacy through the ballot box? When democracy fails to renew its social contract, it not only loses its constituency, but also provides its adversaries with a path to power—in the name of “the people.”

 

Deep Structural Grievances

Recent protests in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and elsewhere represent more than reactions to rising prices. They signal a fracture in the relationship between society, economy and state. The gap between the promise of the welfare state and the lived reality of the middle and working classes widens year on year. Immigration lies at the heart of this: while it is not the root cause of these imbalances, it has become the meeting point for anxieties over job security, housing, belonging and justice.

The paradox is that while Europe needs immigration to address labor shortages, pay for pensions and sustain production, public discourse increasingly portrays migrants as a threat to the economy, stability and national identity. This contradiction feeds the nationalist right: the economy demands immigrants, yet many in society feel they bear the cost of hosting them, without reaping any of the benefits.

Following the Second World War, the European order was built upon a clear social contract: a market economy balanced by a welfare state that guaranteed education, healthcare, pensions and social protection. European citizens largely gave their consent—but the arrangement has been under strain for decades.

Globalization and the subsequent offshoring of industrial production hollowed out entire manufacturing cities. This was compounded by the Great Financial Crisis, the Covid pandemic, energy shocks and inflation, transforming lingering anxiety into a pervasive sense of insecurity.

The cost has come not only in the form of lower incomes, but in terms of the ability to plan for the future. Young people aspiring to start families can rarely do so due to soaring housing costs. Workers live in fear of losing their jobs. Retirees watch their savings erode. Debt-laden governments find themselves incapable of expanding social support.

This economic climate breeds resentment, anger and ultimately, public protest. Those demanding higher wages begin by questioning the fairness of wealth distribution and the state’s capacity to provide protection. Finally, they lose trust in political parties and institutions altogether—and are sold prefabricated explanations and easy scapegoats.

In 2024, the EU’s fertility rate stood at approximately 1.34 children per woman—well below the replacement level of around 2.1 needed for long-term demographic stability and economic productivity.

In this context, immigration is one of the few tools that can help offset the aging of the population and fill labor gaps that the domestic workforce struggles to address—particularly in vital sectors such as healthcare, construction, agriculture, services and technology. Recent European studies indicate that migrant labor has bolstered employment growth and eased market bottlenecks.

Yet economic necessity does not automatically translate into social acceptance. Where an employer sees a migrant as a solution to a labor shortage, a local worker may see a rival for jobs, housing or school placements. This reveals a disconnect between the language of macroeconomics and the daily lived experience of individuals: while a country may gain overall, specific neighborhoods or social groups lose out. Therefore, the core issue is less the volume of immigration than the state’s failure to manage it and to distribute its costs and benefits equitably.

The situation becomes yet more precarious when migrant workers are trapped in a fragile, unregulated economy. This allows employers to exploit these workers with their vulnerable legal status, thus eroding labor rights and further fueling tensions between migrants and local workers. Rather than a conflict between European and migrant workers, the tension here is over an economic model that accepts disparities in protections and wages within a single market.

Meanwhile, states find themselves trapped, forced to increase the taxes and social security burden on workers in order to fund schools, hospitals, housing and infrastructure. In this context, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) studies indicate that the net fiscal impact of migration is limited, varying according to the nature of the migrants and each country’s job market and public finance system. Portraying migrants either as a permanent burden or a guaranteed gain oversimplifies a complex reality.

Furthermore, the housing crisis—a reflection of deeper economic imbalances—has become a focal point for political polarization. Rents and property prices have surged, driven by a slowdown in construction, rising land costs, the neglect of social housing, shifting family structures, the expansion of real estate investment and the combined pressures of population growth and migration. Citizens who have spent years waiting for social housing do not consult urban planning maps or public investment reports; they experience these challenges as crises—making them easy prey for those who blame the situation on migrants.

A problem rooted in supply, demand and poor distribution thus becomes a political battle. The paradox is that migrants themselves are among those most severely affected—suffering from low incomes, discrimination and concentration in marginalized neighborhoods. This intensifies competition among vulnerable groups over scarce resources, while the structural causes that created this situation remain absent from the public debate.

 

Identities, Centers and Peripheries

France is emblematic of these structural shifts in European societies. Traditional industries have declined across many regions, while the most dynamic sectors are concentrated in Paris and other major cities, dividing the country between thriving urban centers and neglected peripheries. Many suburbs suffer rising unemployment and poverty, limited social mobility, and disparities in education and housing.

This cannot be blamed solely on immigration. One must consider ineffective urban policies, discrimination, economic imbalances and poverty, as well as cultural and religious diversity, all of which have made these neighborhoods the subject of heated debates over integration and identity.

The far-right National Rally (RN) of Marine Le Pen has expanded its reach through a carefully crafted platform that emphasizes protecting purchasing power, asserting national sovereignty, tightening immigration controls and criticizing the political elite. This nationalist discourse is no longer purely cultural; it now directly links immigration to wages, housing, and public services and spending.

It thus reframes economic frustration through the language of belonging. Rather than asking how wealth should be distributed, the question becomes: Who is entitled to the state’s resources? As the 2027 presidential election approaches, the cost of living, immigration and public services will be at the heart of the political contest, even if the outcome depends on unpredictable electoral calculations, institutional dynamics and political alliances.

The strength of nationalist parties lies in their ability to weave disparate grievances into a single narrative: a decline in wages fueled by competition from immigrants; rising housing costs fueled by an influx of newcomers; strain on public services and the erosion of sovereignty due to globalization. It is a simple, easily marketable narrative of scapegoating.

While simple, this narrative is misleading. It would be far better to be transparent when communicating with the public—explaining that inflation is driven by productivity, monetary and geopolitical factors; that housing availability is shaped by supply and investment policies; that the decline of certain industries is influenced by technological progress and shifting trade patterns; and that the state of public services is determined by decisions regarding spending, taxation and administration.

Conversely, dismissing genuine local pressures or framing people’s anxieties as moral failings is counterproductive. Condescension will not resolve the crisis: it simply widens the chasm between institutions and voters, handing angry voters on a silver platter to opponents of the political center.

Europe cannot resolve its economic crisis simply by closing its borders. Nor can it overcome social tensions by expanding immigration without proper planning, investment and effective integration. A more sustainable approach requires aligning immigration policies with the needs of the labor market, protecting wages and working conditions, expanding housing and public services, accelerating the recognition of professional qualifications, and developing robust policies for education, language acquisition and integration. It also requires a rethinking of an economic model whose gains accrue to specific groups and regions while others bear a disproportionate share of the costs.

Europe’s political future will be shaped not only by the scale of immigration, but by its governments’ capacity to restore faith in the fairness of their economic and social systems. Popular protests are not necessarily about opposition to immigration, nor does immigration inevitably bring the nationalist right to power. Rather, these phenomena reveal a crisis of political representation—one that risks deepening when citizens feel that the state can no longer protect them economically or manage the social transformations unfolding around them.

Europe’s dilemma is not a choice between the economy and immigration, but rather a question of how to address the failure of politics to reconcile the demands of the economy with the need for social justice. As states increasingly fail to distribute opportunities, the struggle over identity replaces the battle over wealth—and the ballot box becomes an arena for settling scores that economic policies have failed to address.

 

 

 

 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Source: mecouncil.org

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