On February 20, 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated eight international cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). These cartels conduct activities that are overtly criminal: for example, Tren de Aragua (TdA) is associated with kidnapping and extortion, and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) has assassinated Mexican officials and trafficked fentanyl. Less clear is whether the activities of such organizations meet the definition of terrorism. In addition to determining if they meet the necessary criteria for an FTO designation, it is also important to consider these groups’ primary motives as well as whether an FTO designation adds value to law enforcement operations and policy efforts to curb transnational criminal activity. While the issue is multifaceted, the crux of the matter seems to be a question of what resources the United States can leverage against cartels and whether the current tools are enough.
The Difficulty of Defining Terrorism
According to U.S. lawa group can be designated an FTO if it meets three criteria: it is foreign, it conducts terrorism or provides support for terrorist activity, and it threatens U.S. national security. The first criterion—foreign-based—is clearly applicable to these cartels, which are largely based in Latin American countries like Mexico and Venezuela. The third criterion is a variable in terms of the scale of the risk posed to national security, but drug trafficking, human smuggling, and violence (and secondary destabilization of host countries) are all arguably threats to U.S. national security. It is the second criterion that cartels do not fit: criminal violence does not necessarily equate terror.
The absence of a universally agreed-upon definition complicates efforts to evaluate whether an activity can be defined as terrorism. For example, in Section 212 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, terrorist activity means “any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State).” Specific actions include vehicle hijacking, hostage-taking, attacks upon an “internationally protected person,” assassination, use of biological or chemical agents, and use of weapons with the intent to damage property or endanger people. Under this definition, many criminal activities could be considered terrorist activities. However, in Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (emphasis added). This definition is specific in its inclusion of a political component, thus rendering the definition of terrorism less applicable to transnational criminal groups. These organizations—though committing violence against noncombatants —tend to be more motivated by financial gain than by political goal or ideology.
Of course, the line between organized criminals and terrorist organizations is not always distinct, existing somewhere within the “crime-terrorism nexus.” Some terrorist groups engage in crime to support their operations, such as the Filipino Abu Sayyaf Group’s arms trafficking endeavors. Other times, criminal organizations may engage in acts of terror, such as the Medellin cartel’s detonation of Avianca Flight 203. The bomb targeted two informants who had cooperated with Colombian law enforcement but killed all 110 passengers on the aircraft, meeting Section 140’s terrorism requirements of premeditated violence by a subnational group against noncombatant targets. But was it politically-motivated?
It is worth considering that while a criminal group’s retaliation against its government’s actions may be considered political at first glance, the intent behind such attacks tends to signal a desire to maintain their operational autonomy rather than to attain political change or further an agenda. John Rollin and Liana Wyler from the Congressional Research Service explain: “Simply engaging in criminality does not mean that an armed group exists to be criminal.” It follows that engaging in political violence does not make a criminal organization a terrorist group. Isolated actions do not necessarily indicate an ideology. Given that the bomb on Flight 203 was intended for the two informants, perhaps violent acts like this—straddling the line between criminality and terrorism— would be better understood as murder with massive collateral damage.
The Benefits & Drawbacks of Defining Cartels as Terrorist Groups
Given the different definitions of terrorism and the inherent murkiness of classifying violence into subcategories of murder, assassination, or terror, perhaps more critical is understanding the reason why the United States wantsto designate cartels as FTOs or SDGTs. A terrorist designation isolates an organization by criminalizing contact with their members and blocking their access to financial systems, all while allowing the United States seemingly greater power to pursue these groups. Additionally, a terrorism designation is partially a persuasion of pathos: terrorism inherently carries more emotional weight than crime, elevating the threat from a far-away problem to an active danger to U.S. security. As RAND researcher Brian Michael Jenkins suggests“People view terrorism as more heinous than ordinary crime.” Furthermore, by inflicting fear and violence, transnational criminal groups often terrorize their local populations. But is this enough to classify them as terrorists?
While it may seem beneficial to amplify the dangers of transnational criminal organizations and diversify the tools available to U.S. authorities, there are several drawbacks. The first is that it is a predominantly redundant classification with a few exceptions: designation as a transnational criminal organization or applying the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) means that the U.S. government can already freeze a group’s assets and penalize many of their activities. Admittedly, an FTO designation further extends the applicability of penalties to allow the prosecution of material support violations (an extensive list that includes provision of funding, lodging, or transportation to terrorist organizations), apply secondary sanctions to financial institutions that provide services to previously-sanctioned individuals, and deny entry into the United States for reasons beyond drug trafficking or criminal acts.
Yet, this expansion of authorities creates a second drawback: extending penalties to secondary institutions may cause otherwise beneficial organizations to withdraw services that help local populations. Aid organizations operating under criminally controlled zones, for example, could be held liable for providing material supporteven though the intent is to help the civilian population. Under the FTO designation, the crime is provision of support, not intent. Banks and other monetary services may choose to cease financial operations in questionable zones to avoid legal repercussions, further harming local populations and cutting off aid organizations and businesses fearing sanctions.
A third consequence—as has been demonstrated—is that applying the terrorist designation to cartels can lead to international outcry and soured relations. Beyond the diplomatic backlash from placing blame on foreign partners and potentially damaging their tourism and investment sectors, U.S. military action against the newly minted FTOs has led Latin American governments to accuse the United States of violating international law. In Operation Southern Spearthe United States launched airstrikes against boats supposedly transporting illegal narcotics for the cartels. Yet,the power to take military action is not included in the provisions put forth by a terrorist designation; presidential authority was the primary justification described by the Department of Defense. If such power resides with the executive, why was an FTO designation necessary?
Policy Adjustments
Rather than relabeling a criminal organization with an FTO designation, it would be more beneficial to rework existing legislation or reassess the resources and priorities given to combatting transnational criminal groups. To start, U.S. legislators could amend the Kingpin Act to include any financial sanctions or material support restrictions that an FTO designation would grant, thereby establishing similar authorities without confusing crime for terrorism. Professor Tricia Bacon from American University recommends a second option, arguing that prioritizing transnational crime as a matter of national intelligence and allocating more resources that target the enablers of such activities in other countries, such as corruption and insufficient security force training, may prove more effective.
A third option is to reduce bureaucratic complexity and centralize efforts against organized crime, which has been attempted by various administrations. As a category, transnational crime is not addressed by a single agency. Drug trafficking operations may fall under the purview of the Drug Enforcement Agency, but cyber and financial crimes fall under the jurisdiction of multiple agenciessuch as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Previously, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (OCDETF) helped bridge this divide as a single program under the Department of Justice. The second Trump administration argued that transnational crime is too complex to be handled by one agency, and has since replaced the OCDETF with 59 interagency-derived Homeland Security Task Force units. Given the magnitude of addressing organized crime, it is perhaps too soon to determine the long-term efficacy of this measure.
Conclusion
Labels are important. In matters of national security and foreign policy, they can help determine which course of action is most appropriate to take. Yet, whatever acronym a criminal organization may be labeled, they remain a critical, ever-present and ever-adaptive challenge to U.S. interests and international security at large. A point of unanimity is that cartels are criminal actors. The United States and the international community have resources to target and investigate these actors, such as sanctions and partnered initiatives. If an organization’s influence and capacity to create violence can be damaged by strengthened financial regulations, bolstered governmental security capabilities, or reorganized bureaucracy—all of which can be accomplished without a terrorist designation—then an FTO label is not worth the fallout.
Image Credit: U.S. Department of WarSgt. Daniel Childs
The appearance of U.S. Department of War (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoW endorsement.
Source: gssr.georgetown.edu



