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New book: Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics
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New book: Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics

I am happy to say that on 26 November my new book “Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom” will be published with Hart. The book focuses on topics I have been interested in for several years; namely, how the executive branch internally structures the way it receives legal advice; how respect for legality is made

I am happy to say that on 26 November my new book “Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom” will be published with Hart. The book focuses on topics I have been interested in for several years; namely, how the executive branch internally structures the way it receives legal advice; how respect for legality is made concrete and practically institutionalized within the executive branch; how legal advice can act as a Janus-faced source of executive constraint and empowerment; and how different design choices and cultural norms profoundly shape the extent to which government lawyers, as a class of constitutional actor, restrain or facilitate public power. I am also interested in the ways in which a polity’s system of government lawyering can contribute to, or hinder, good governance for the common good. In what follows, I offer a short introduction to the main topics of the book, in the off chance it might be of interest to some of our readers. I am conscious, of course, that this work is a good deal more “wonky” or “Dryasdust” than we usually feature at the New Digest. But for those few who might find it of interest, the book can be found here: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/government-lawyers-in-the-united-kingdom-9781509989270/

Introduction to Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics (Hart, 2026)

Public lawyers in the UK rightly devote enormous attention to the exercise of public power. We study judicial review, statutory interpretation, parliamentary sovereignty, devolution, human rights law, and so on. All of this concerns how public power is generated, channelled, and constrained.

But despite this focus, we spend far less time examining the most powerful branch of government—the executive—especially its internal workings. That includes the actors and mechanisms that shape executive action. Within the executive, there is a group that have been particularly neglected in the literature: government lawyers.

Over the last several decades, there have been only a handful of monographs and a few dozen articles on the subject. Some of that work is excellent, but much of it is now outdated, and none of the contemporary work systemic or comprehensive. The field is not entirely terra nullius, but it is certainly not occupied by a bustling town.

One reason I wrote this book, then, was to address what I see as a significant gap in our understanding of how the executive is internally constituted and regulated, how it relates to law and legality in practice, and what role government lawyers play in how it exercises power.

Who are our government lawyers?

What does that system look like today? The vast majority of domestic legal advice—well over 90 percent—is provided by around 2,500 civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department, headed by the Treasury Solicitor. This is an office with origins in the seventeenth century that expanded in size as the Attorney and Solicitor General became unable to handle the sheer volume of government legal work.

These lawyers are organised into advisory teams aligned with individual government departments. They are, in effect, the front line of government lawyering.

For international law, the primary source of advice is the Legal Directorate in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. It has roughly 100 lawyers.

Where specialist input is required, where legal questions are particularly tricky or raise the prospect of litigation—or where officials seek a second opinion—government lawyers may turn to panel counsel. These are barristers appointed by the Attorney General through a competitive process to undertake government work.

This is a distinctive feature of the UK system: a considerable amount of specialist legal advice is provided by private practitioners, who may also act against the government in other cases.

For more significant or contested issues, matters can be escalated. Advice may be sought from the Treasury Solicitor, or from the First Treasury Counsel—the so-called “Treasury Devil”—a senior barrister who works exclusively for the government for a fixed term.

At the highest level sit the Law Officers: the Attorney General and Solicitor General. They deal with the most important, sensitive, and politically salient legal questions.

They are also the only genuinely political lawyers in the system. They are ministers, drawn from Parliament, and when they advise, that advice constitutes the government’s definitive legal position.

Running alongside this advisory structure is the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel—an elite group of around 50 lawyers responsible for drafting primary legislation. They too may refer issues to the Attorney General where necessary.

That, in outline, is the current ecosystem of government lawyering.

The structure of the book

It opens with a discussion of its aims, my reasons for writing, the methodology, and the limits of its scope. The main limitation is that I focus on lawyers advising the UK Government and its core departments. I do not examine devolved governments or their internal legal arrangements. I also focus on advisory and drafting work—the civil side of government lawyering. I do not deal in detail with prosecutorial functions carried out through bodies like the Crown Prosecution Service or the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The book is in large measure an exploratory work, mapping underexamined constitutional terrain. Accordingly, it makes a range of claims along the way. Some are descriptive, and aimed at capturing how government lawyering works in practice. Some are constitutional—identifying conventions that structure the relationship between lawyers and officials. And some are normative, particularly toward the end, where I assess the contribution government lawyers make to constitutional government. It is, in short, more a fox than a hedgehog of a book.

Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the relationship between law, lawyers, and executive power in the English—later UK—constitution. It also sketches how the current institutional system of government lawyering emerged. We often say that the Crown is bound by the law of the land. That is true enough. But how has that principle been realised in practice?

Most monarchs were not trained lawyers. They did not have law reports on their desks. Some—James I, for example—saw themselves as capable jurists. But most relied on legal professionals to explain the limits of their authority and how to pursue their objectives within those limits. This chapter shows that government lawyering has a deep constitutional history. Government lawyers did not suddenly appear in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. In one form or another, they have always been present. It traces who monarchs relied on for advice, and how certain offices—most notably the Attorney General and Solicitor General—rose in prominence and came to eclipse other sources of legal advice.

The chapter then turns to the development of the current system. Like much of British public law, this system evolved incrementally, rather than being designed from first principles. I give a series of vignettes showing how the system we have took shape. In addition to telling the story of how we have the system we have today, another point of the chapter is to show that today’s government lawyers are heirs to a long constitutional tradition. They have long had to navigate a set of enduring tensions: between advancing the executive’s objectives and stating the law faithfully; between loyalty to ministers and commitment to broader notions of constitutional propriety and principle.

After Chapter 2, the book turns to its core: a sustained analysis of how legal advice is produced and used within government. Chapter 11, toward the end, deals with legislative drafting. The greater focus on advisory work reflects not greater importance, but greater complexity. Drafting is equally significant but more structured and therefore easier to describe in a more compressed way.

Chapters 3 to 6 examine the main institutional actors I have just introduced: the Government Legal Department, the Legal Directorate of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the barristers on the Attorney General’s panels, and the Law Officers. These chapters go into what may, depending on your taste, seem either like rich detail or dense description. But I think the detail is necessary. There is no comprehensive contemporary treatment of these actors: how they are organised, how they are internally structured, their professional ethos, their sense of role morality and place in the constitution, and how they all interact with one another.

These are important constitutional actors, and so it matters that we know who they are and how they are organised. Those chapters, then, are intended to be rich in detail and information so that we can have good answers to such questions.

Chapters 7 and 8 examine how the system of government lawyering works in practice: how legal advice is sought, how it is formulated, and how it is communicated within government.

I also look at how legal materials and sources are analysed by government lawyers, how legal risk is assessed and presented, how disagreements over legal advice are resolved, and how second or third opinions are obtained where officials want them. I think readers of these chapters will come away with a much sharper picture of how government lawyering operates in practice. In my view, several features stand out from examining the procedures and substantive principles that govern their work.

First, most of the legal advice is not given by the Attorney General or the Treasury Devil—the figures one is most likely to see mentioned in the press. It is given by civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department. They are very much the foot soldiers of government lawyering, the rock on which the overall system is built.

Second, the legal advice process is highly iterative. It is highly collaborative and deeply embedded in policy-making from a very early stage. The back-and-forth between government lawyers and policy officials does not happen only at the end of the policy process, when legal sign-off is sought for an already settled policy. It happens from the beginning. Policy is shaped by legal considerations from the outset. The process of generating advice is also highly collaborative. It is rarely the product of a single mind but will have input from several actors.

The rules concerning the escalation of legal questions, when it should be referred to a more senior source of advice, or when it should go to the very top, to the Law Officers, are largely unwritten. But they are nonetheless generally well understood and internalised by government lawyers. It is also understood that any government lawyer can go directly to the law officers with an issue, without permission of their relevant minister. This is very rare but seen as an important safeguard.

The advice of the Law Officers has unquestioned primacy within government. I argue that there is a constitutional convention that it cannot be sidestepped. Once the Law Officers decide a legal question, that is the government’s legal position. The government cannot go elsewhere. It cannot forum-shop once the issue has reached the Law Officers. I also argue that there is a constitutional convention that if the Law Officers advise that there is no respectable legal basis for a proposed course of action in domestic law, the government cannot proceed.

Paradoxically, however, despite the unquestioned primacy of Law Officers’ advice, there is no sophisticated or well-developed system for treating their past advice as internal precedent for government.

There are a few domains in which something like precedent operates—war powers, European Union matters, and devolution—but in most areas the authority of advice is time-bound. In some respects, it stays with the incumbent office-holder and does not travel far beyond their time in office. That contrasts with systems such as that of the United States and how the opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel are treated within the executive branch.

Substantively, government lawyers approach legal analysis through a combination of a court-centred approach and a risk-based approach. It is risk-based in the sense that government lawyers do not present their opinions like courts. They do not simply say: this is my best professional judgment of what the law is, your policy does not match it, and therefore it is unlawful. That is not how they operate.

To be sure, their starting point is to ask: what would a competent court make of this issue? What is the best view of the law? That is their fixed point for analysing legal materials. Around that fixed point, however, analysis then turns to the legal risk associated with alternative arguments.

You have the best view of the law in mind—but what about the alternative arguments that support the policy? How persuasive are they? What are the risks involved? Can we say there is a 50% chance the legal arguments for the policy will be accepted? 40%? These are their bread-and-butter questions.

So they combine elements of both approaches. They do not merely ask whether there is some reasonable argument available to support the government’s position. But nor do they simply identify what they take to be the single best view of the law and insist that only this can be acted upon as a legal basis for action.

Government lawyers are encouraged and trained to be constructive, solution-oriented, and practically minded. They want to help the government achieve its objectives by suggesting ways of making policy more legally robust. But it must be stressed that they are not trying to develop a separate executive jurisprudence. They are not departmentalists, to use a term much in vogue in constitutional theory. The anchor of their analysis remains what a competent court would decide. In that sense, they work within a horizon of judicial supremacy over what the law is and requires.

I also highlight that there is very little evidence that government lawyers are pressured to slant their advice, or that they would yield to such pressure if it were applied. Respect for the independence of their professional judgment is deeply embedded within government.

That applies not only to civil servant lawyers and panel counsel, but also to the Law Officers. The Law Officers have both legal and political functions, but there is vanishingly little evidence that they succumb to political bias or are subject to pressure, even in moments of acute political difficulty or high stakes for the Prime Minister.

I also challenge the idea that government lawyers, as a class of public servants, are excessively risk-averse or unduly cautious. More often, I think, the real risk aversion lies with the officials who receive the advice. These officials may be told that there is a respectable legal basis for a policy, but also that there are serious litigation risks. A Government lawyer might say that we have a legal argument that is 40 per cent likely to be upheld and 60 per cent likely to fail. Officials may simply not want to run that risk. So the real caution often lies there. At the same time, government lawyers are operating in an environment of much greater legal uncertainty than they did several decades ago, owing to developments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the broader expansion in both the grounds and intensity of judicial review. This makes it unsurprising if they are regularly identifying a range of legal risks. But the choice to remove the sources of these legal risks can only lie with ministers and with Parliament.

Chapter 9 then considers the impact of legal advice: the weight given to it in executive decision-making. This was a difficult chapter to write, because it is notoriously hard to pin down how much weight decision-makers actually give to legal advice, especially where it appears to conflict with their first-order policy objectives. I do not attempt anything like an empirical or quantitative account. My account is impressionistic and suggestive. It is built from anecdote, biography, and narrative accounts offered by both officials and government lawyers.

That is a limitation. But I also think the evidence displays such consistency, over time and across different actors, that it points to a real cultural and political phenomenon: namely, that law and legality are taken very seriously within the United Kingdom government. I think there is good evidence that there is a standing approach within government whereby, if government lawyers say there is no respectable legal basis for a policy, the government will not proceed.

What usually happens instead is that the policy is abandoned, modified to make it more legally robust, or the issue is escalated to more senior sources of advice, until it reaches the Law Officers. And when the Law Officers advise that a policy is unlawful in domestic law, I think there is a convention that the government will not proceed. It understands itself to be constitutionally bound.

Where the issue concerns international law, the position is more complicated. I do not think there is an equivalent convention, because there are too many examples of governments proceeding, with the blessing of the Attorney General, in circumstances where the legal basis is contested. But I do think there is a strong presumption against proceeding where the Attorney advises that there is no respectable basis in international law.

One point I am at pains to stress in the book is that the work of government lawyers should not merely be seen as a constraint on executive power. That is certainly an important aspect of what they do, but it is not the whole picture. The work of government lawyers is also critical to enabling the effective deployment of public power by the executive. It is critical in several respects. Legal advice, for one thing, helps clarify what the executive can lawfully do. In a specialised and highly complex modern society, the law constitutes a domain of semi-autonomous discourse and practice. Government lawyers possess the expertise necessary to enable the executive to navigate this domain—to understand the extent of its powers, how far those powers can be pushed, and, critically, to help transform governmental will, preferences, and policy aims into legally effective decisions, orders, rules, bills, statutes, and so forth.

In a constitutional system such as that of the United Kingdom, where there is a strong cultural premium placed on legality and an expectation of lawful conduct, that form of legal validation—the ability to say that one’s position rests on a respectable legal basis articulated by professional legal advisers—is essential to political legitimacy and credibility. The work of government lawyers, in these ways sense, has a distinctly power-generating quality.

Chapter 10 examines the confidentiality and privilege associated with government legal advice. It considers the tight control that government can exercise over the advice it receives. I broadly accept the justification for maintaining confidentiality in respect of the full legal advice. Preserving a strong measure of confidentiality allows the executive to legally stress-test its policies and helps to avoid timidity, excessive risk aversion, and indecision, by ensuring that ideas can be rigorously examined in private before being exposed to parliamentary scrutiny. At the same time, there are clear risks associated with a policy of total opacity in respect of legal advice. These risks are documented in the chapter.

The central argument of the chapter, however, is my revisionist account of the dominant understanding of what is known as the Law Officers’ Convention—namely, the circumstances in which the advice of the Law Officers may be disclosed outside government.

Governments have increasingly asserted to Parliament that the convention not only prohibits disclosure of the full terms of Law Officers’ advice, but also extends to the gist or summary of that advice, and even to the fact that advice was given at all—save in the most exceptional circumstances. My argument is that this account is far too broad and unduly restrictive of parliamentary scrutiny and debate.

The better reading of constitutional practice is that the scope of the convention is considerably narrower. There is, in my view, a strong and justifiable convention against disclosing the full terms of the advice—the actual memorandum, email, or record of advice.

However, constitutional practice and history do not support the existence of any constitutional bar on disclosing either the fact that advice was given or the broad terms of that advice. What the government has here is a permissive power to withhold or disclose this information, a straightforward privilege, one that is not contingent on needing exceptional justification to waive.

Accordingly, parliamentarians act entirely with constitutionally proper when they seek disclosure of the fact or general content of legal advice, in order to hold government to account on contentious matters.

The chapter therefore seeks both to outline the law governing legal professional privilege and to challenge some of the more expansive orthodoxies surrounding the convention.

Chapter 11 offers an account of the various roles and responsibilities played by government lawyers in the legislative process—from the initial formulation of policy, through the conversion of policy into a bill, to the bill’s passage through Parliament and its enactment as a statute.

I examine the role played by actors already encountered, such as the Government Legal Department and the Law Officers, but place particular emphasis on the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, who are the most prominent and important government lawyers in the legislative process. These lawyers are essential to the government’s ability to exercise public power in areas such as raising taxes, appropriating revenue, and altering the law of the land—each of which requires ministers to act through statutory authority created via a highly specialised legislative process.

If statutes and regulations are to have their intended legal and practical effect, they must be drafted with precision. They must use the right words in the right order, be intelligible to those tasked with implementing them—such as officials and judges—and cohere with the existing body of law and its canons, presumptions and so on. Parliamentary Counsel are therefore indispensable as a specialist cadre whose expertise lies in translating the executive’s policy intentions, normative preferences, and ideological commitments into legally effective legislative form. They are a critical source of governmental power.

At the same time, there is an important sense in which Parliamentary Counsel also channel—and at times limit—the exercise of governmental power. They do so by shaping the form and mode through which executive will is legally expressed in statute. In our constitution, there is a very longstanding tradition within the Office of embedding rule of law values into drafting practice. In practical terms, this includes a presumption against facilitating retroactive legislation; against rapid commencements that deprive individuals of the opportunity to understand the new legal position; against the use of vague language in criminal offences; and against conferring broad Henry VIII powers—namely, powers enabling ministers to amend primary legislation by statutory instrument.

The institutional authority of the Office means that when Parliamentary Counsel raise concerns that a proposal conflicts with rule of law values, that pushback is taken seriously. While not always determinative, it is often influential and frequently prevails.

Chapter 12 concludes the book by offering a normative evaluation of the work of government lawyers in the United Kingdom. The account is broadly positive. The book argues that the work of government lawyers can be understood as an institutional and practical instantiation of the United Kingdom’s longstanding commitment to legality and the rule of law.

As noted, Parliamentary Counsel have long contributed to this commitment by shaping legislation in accordance with rule of law values, thereby channelling and constraining the exercise of governmental power. Respect for legality is also reflected in the deep integration of government lawyers into the policymaking process, the protection of their independence and non-partisanship, and the weight accorded to their advice within executive deliberation.

Government lawyers are therefore central to what might be described as the executive’s practice of constitutional self-restraint: the internal organisation of government in a manner that promotes lawful and constitutionally attentive decision-making. At the same time, government lawyers are also essential to the executive’s ability to exercise public power effectively in pursuit of the common good.

Legal reasoning about the scope and limits of governmental power is highly technical and requires mastery of legal sources and methods—statutes, prerogative powers, regulations, conventions, and precedent. Their specialised expertise enables lawyers to help the government to navigate the demands of the law and translate policy into legally authoritative and constitutionally legitimate forms—into legally valid political orders, decisions, and statutes. This is the power-generating dimension of their role.

In conclusion, government lawyers operate at the intersection of law and politics. To fulfil their constitutional role, they must respond to demands arising from both domains. They must respect the integrity of the law and their professional obligations, while also assisting the government of the day in realizing its political objectives.

The system of government lawyering in the United Kingdom contributes to good governance by cultivating lawyers capable of maintaining this delicate balance—between enabling the effective use of public power and ensuring that such power is exercised lawfully and in accordance with constitutional principle; between advancing governmental aims and providing candid, independent legal advice that may not always align with political preference.

So long as this balance is maintained, government lawyers remain a critical component of good governance within the United Kingdom’s constitutional order.

Source: thenewdigest.substack.com

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